Proving the guilt of murder

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Question 1 Amina may be guilty of the murder of Yasin and Khadija.

Khadija

To establish a case of murder, the prosecution must prove (1) that the unlawful death of Khadija was caused by an act (or omission)[1] of Amina; and (2) that Amina did that act (or omitted to act) with malice aforethought[2], whether express or implied[3]. So far as causation is concerned, in the context of homicide offences, this simply means that Khadija’s death was 'accelerated' by Amina’s actions[4]. The burden of proving that Amina is guilty remains on the prosecution throughout the trial and unless Amina wishes to raise a special defence of insanity or diminished responsibility (discussed later) she will at no point be required to establish any defence, or partial defence, to the charge[5]. The ‘malice aforethought’, which is the ‘mental’ element of murder, may either consist of an intention to kill unlawfully (express malice) or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, i.e. really serious harm[6], unlawfully (implied malice)[7]. It is not sufficient for the finding of intent that Khadija’s death was a natural and probable consequence of Amina’s action; the relevant question is whether Amina did intend or foresee Khadija’s death (or the fact that Khadija would sustain grievous bodily harm), “by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as may be proper in the circumstances”[8]. The fact that Amina foresaw that Khadija would die or sustain grevious bodily harm from the multiple stab wounds is not conclusive evidence of intention but is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration[9]. Neither is the fact that Khadija’s death was a virtually certain result of Amina’s actions conclusive; although the greater the probability of a consequence, the more likely it is that it was foreseen and, if that consequence was foreseen, the more likely it is that it was also intended[10]. On the facts, it would seem that Amina would be found guilty of Khadija’s death. The act of stabbing Khadija ‘accelerated’ her death, and although the finding of intent will be a matter for the jury, it is clear that Khadija would die or at least sustain ‘very serious harm’ from being stabbed multiple times; it is highly likely therefore that the jury would rule that this was foreseen and therefore intended[11].

Yasin

The first element to be proved to establish the offence of murder is to show that the unlawful death of Yasin was ‘caused’ by Amina’s act of stabbing Yasin in the stomach once using a bread knife. Although there is the later issue of Jake’s negligent treatment, it is certain that but for Amina’s act, Yasin would not have died. Amina’s conduct does not have to be the sole or the effective cause of Yasin’s death: it will be sufficient that it is a cause “which cannot be dismissed as minimal or as slight or trifling”[12]. So far as Yasin’s death is concerned, there may be two or more independent operative causes, and any person whose conduct constitutes a substantial (more than minimal) cause may be convicted of an offence in respect of his death[13]. We are told that, during the operation to save Yasin's life, Jake, the anaesthetist, who was newly qualified, did not realise that the tube supplying oxygen to Yasin had become detached and Yasin died. Amina could argue that the chain of causation was broken by Jake’s actions, using R v Jordan (1956)[14] as an authority, which decided that if medical treatment received was the sole cause of death, and was grossly negligent, the chain would be broken. However, there are cases that since suggest the argument in Jordan will be very difficult to use. For example, in R v Smith (1959)[15], the defendant stabbed the victim in a brawl and en route to the medical orderly, the victim was dropped twice; the medical orderly then failed to diagnose the full extent of his wounds. The victim died, but the defendant’s conviction for murder was upheld as the wound was still an operating cause of death and so the chain of causation was not broken. Similarly, in R v Mellor (1996)[16], the appelant’s argument that the substantial cause of death was the failure of the medical staff at the hospital to administer sufficient oxygen to the victim failed, on the basis that, per Schiemann LJ, there was no onus on the Crown to prove that any supervening cause, such as medical treatment, was not a substantial cause of death. In R v Cheshire (1991)[17], Bedlam LJ stated: “It will only be in the most extraordinary and unusual case that such treatment can be said to be so independent of the acts of the accused that it could be regarded in law as the cause of the victim’s death to the exclusion of the accused’s act”. In every case, it is a question of fact and degree, and is for the jury to decide, having regard to the gravity of the supervening event, and to whether the injuries inflicted by the defendant are a significant cause of death[18]. Although the medical treatment Yasin received was incompetent, therefore, Amina would still be guilty of murder if the wound was the operating and substantial cause of death. We are told that Yasin required life saving treatment and so we can assume this is the case. It will also be necessary to establish that the requisite mens rea existed; Amina must have either intended to kill Yasin, or intended to cause grievous bodily harm, i.e. really serious harm[19]. As for Khadija, it is not sufficient for the finding of intent that Yasin’s death was a natural and probable consequence of Amina’s action; the relevant question is whether Amina did intend or foresee Yasin’s death (or the fact that Yasin would sustain grievous bodily harm). As for Khadija, the fact that Amina foresaw that Yasin would die or sustain grievous bodily harm from the stab wound to the stomach is not conclusive evidence of intention but is a relevant factor[20]. Of note here, Amina only stabs Yasin once, whereas she stabs Khadija several times – this could perhaps indicate that she doesn’t intend to kill Yasin. However, it is virtually certain that Yasin would sustain grevious bodily harm from such an attack, which is all that is required for the mens rea of murder, and so it is likely to be regarded as foreseen, and therefore intended[21]. It is likely therefore that Amina will be found guilty of the murder of Yasin.

Defences

Provocation

If Amina successfully raises the defence of provocation, this may reduce a charge of murder to one of manslaughter. The test of whether the defence of provocation is entitled to succeed is a dual one. The alleged conduct causing the provocation must (i) actually cause “a sudden and temporary loss of self control” making the defendant so subject to passion that he is not the master of his hand (the subjective test); and (ii) the provocation must be sufficient to make a reasonable man do as the defendant did (the objective test). Provocation may consist of things done or said, or both, and the question as to whether this was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did is one for the jury, taking into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in the jury's opinion, it would have on a reasonable man[22]. The facts state that Amina found Yasin in their bedroom asleep, with another woman, Khadija, lying beside him. Of note, anything can amount to provocation and so this conduct will suffice[23]. Amina goes downstairs, picks up a bread-knife, returns to the bedroom and stabs Yasin and then Khadija. The time elapsing between the provocation and the killing is relatively short[24], which suggests that there indeed was a sudden temporary loss of control. To satisfy the objective stage, it is necessary to show that a reasonable person would have reacted the same way as Amina did, and the key decision in this area is R v Smith (Morgan) (2000) 4 All ER 289. Amina’s characteristics can be taken into account as with regards to the gravity of the provocation and degree of self control expected. Presumably characteristics such as the repeated beatings that Amina has endured could be taken into account as a factor in explaining why Amina reacted so violently to the situation. The test requires that the jury ask whether Amina exercised what was reasonable self control for her. Jealously alone should not be taken into account[25], but Yasin’s repeated beatings may be a factor. Previous cases show that if the defendant has endured abuse over a period of time, particularly where this has resulted in 'battered woman syndrome', a jury may more readily find that there was a sudden loss of control triggered by even a minor incident – the incident proves to be the ‘last straw’ for the defendant[26]. It seems likely on the facts that Amina will be able to use the defence of provocation to reduce the charge to one of manslaughter. There are two counts on which Amina may wish to raise the defence of provocation. The first relates to the repeated beatings that Yasin has given her over a number of years.

Diminished responsibility

Amina may be able to claim diminished responsibility if she can show that at the time of the murder, she was suffering from such abnormality of mind as substantially impaired her mental responsibility[27] for her acts in carrying out the killings[28]. Abnormality of mind', means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal[29]. The onus will be on Amina to prove the defence, but only a preponderance of probabilities must be shown[30]. If the defence is successful, Amina will be changed with manslaughter rather than murder[31]. Of note 'Battered women's syndrome', which was listed in the British Classification of Mental Diseases in 1994, can give rise to the defence of diminished responsibility[32]. Amina may therefore be able to use this defence on the basis that Yasin has beat her over a period of time and she is suffering from the syndrome as a result. If she is able to adduce medical evidence of the syndrome, the court may accept it and this will avoid a trial for murder altogether[33]. Amina may try to get the charge reduced to manslaughter on the basis of both provocation and diminished responsibility, and if the jury does return a verdict of manslaughter, the judge may ask the jury on which ground its verdict is based or whether it was based on both grounds[34]. In conclusion, it seems that Amina would be found guilty for both the murder of Yasin and Khadija, but may have both the defences of provocation and diminished responsibility available to her, which would reduce the charge to manslaughter. -------------------

Bertram’s liability under Section 18 OAPA1861

Bertram may be guilty of maliciously wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent, under Section 18 OAPA1861. The maximum sentence for this offence on conviction is imprisonment for life. The actus reus of the offence, either maliciously wounding or causing grievous bodily harm, usually requires a break in the surface of the skin[35]. The actions in relation to tightening a belt round Amelia’s neck causing her to suffer from distorted vision and headaches will probably not therefore suffice for the purposes of Section 18; although the meaning of grievous bodily harm is “not limited to the skin, flesh and bones of the victim, but also includes an identifiable psychiatric injury”[36]. Whether Amelia’s headaches and distorted vision amount to an identifiable psychiatric injury will be judged objectively, according to the ordinary standards of usage and experience, and not subjectively from the standpoint of how Amelia would describe it[37]. The act of burning Amelia with lighter fluid will almost certainly amount to a sufficient act for this purpose however; the facts state that her injuries were serious and required skin grafts. To establish an offence under Section 18, it must also be shown that Bertram is 'malicious'; in that he specifically intended his actions to result in some unlawful bodily harm to Amelia; not that he was just reckless as to whether the harm may occur[38]. The prosecution will have to prove that it was his purpose to do some grievous bodily harm, or that in tightening the belt round Amelia’s neck, he foresaw such harm as at least virtually certain, permitting the jury to infer the necessary intent[39]. On the facts, it does not seem that Bertram really intended to hurt Amelia – clearly his actions were for pleasure. It is unlikely that he would be found guilty under Section 18 therefore.

Bertram’s liability under Section 20 OAPA1861

Bertram may be guilty of the lesser offence of maliciously wounding or maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm under Section 20 OAPA1861. The maximum sentence on conviction for this offence is five years. For this offence, again there usually will be a break in the surface of the skin[40], although as before, the question of whether the headaches and distorted vision amount to an identifiable psychiatric illness equating to grievous bodily harm will be judged objectively, according to the ordinary standards of usage and experience. Of note, in R v Burstow [1997][41], it was held that a stalker could be convicted of an offence under Section 20 even where he had not applied physical violence directly or indirectly to the body of the victim. This suggests that the headaches and distorted vision may qualify towards establishing the offence. The burns to Amelia’s skin will certainly qualify as malicious wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm due to their severity. The mens rea for a Section 20 offence is denoted by the word 'maliciously', and for Section 20, it will be sufficient to prove that Bertram intended his act to result in some unlawful bodily harm to some other person, or alternatively was subjectively reckless as to the risk that his act might result in such harm[42]. He must at very least foresee the possibility of some physical harm occurring or he will not be liable under Section 20[43]. On the facts, there is a strong possibility that Bertram would be liable under Section 20; although he is surprised by the extent of the flames, at least some physical harm would be a virtual certainty.

Bertram’s liability under Section 47 OAPA1861

If the Section 20 charge fails, perhaps for lack of intent, Bertram could be charged under Section 47 OAPA1861 for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The maximum sentence for this office on conviction is five years’ imprisonment. It will be necessary to show that Bertram assaulted Amelia, in that he caused her to apprehend an immediate infliction of violence or carried out the actual infliction of violence occasioning bodily harm. Bodily harm is defined in R v Chan-Fook [1994][44] as being any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim. Amelia’s injuries, both in relation to the belt and the burns, would definitely satisfy this criteria. Liability will be established if it can be shown that Bertram has the mens rea of common assault, which is intention or recklessness. Bertram may not have intended the harm caused to Amelia but may well have been reckless as to the harm being caused, in that he was aware of the risk of harm, and took the risk unreasonably[45]. It seems likely that, at very least, he would be guilty of an offence under Section 47 as it would be virtually certain that his actions would cause at least some harm. As a defence to his actions, Bertram may seek to argue that Amelia consented to the harm caused. The evidential burden of proof lies with Bertram who must produce evidence of consent before the judge is required to put it before the jury. R v Donavon (1934)[46] is the authority for the fact that a victim may not validly consent to physical harm if it amounts to actual bodily harm or worse, unless the activity comes within a range of policy based exceptions[47]. We have already established that Bertram is very likely to be charged with Section 20 or Section 47 OAPA1861, and so he will only be able to argue consent if it does fall within an exception. Such exceptions were considered in R v Brown [1993][48] in which a group of homosexual males were being tried for, inter alia, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and unlawful wounding under the OAPA1861 for participating in sado-masochistic practices. The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeals against conviction, but asked for guidance as to whether it was necessary for the prosecution to prove lack of consent to establish guilt under Section 20 or Section 47 OAPA1861. By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords held that consent was irrelevant; the conduct was presumptively unlawful in that it involved “violence, cruelty and abnormal and perverted homosexual activity”, which was “unpredictably dangerous and degrading to body and mind”. The activities fell within the definition of the offences and since injury was both intended and caused, consent was irrelevant unless the Court could find that there was a good reason to allow the activity (i.e. public policy reasons, as for sporting activities like boxing). The majority of the Lords held that there were several good reasons why the defence should not be extended to cover such activities relating, inter alia, to the risk of serious infections, injuries and spreading diseases such as AIDS - there was therefore no public interest in permitting such practices. As a result, consent is a defence only to common assault where no injury is caused and or/intended but where it is intended and/or caused, it will be no defence unless there is a reason to justify it in the public interest. So far as Bertram is concerned, then, it is highly unlikely that he will successfully be able to raise the defence of consent since the practices that the assaults referred to were similarly dangerous and risked serious injury, as for those in R v Brown [1993][49], and there are no public policy reasons for allowing them. We are told that Amelia pursues Bertram for over a year with letters, cards and telephone calls begging him to return and that as a result, Bertram suffers from anxiety and nervousness requiring psychiatric counselling; we are also told he has to give up his job for lack of concentration. The issue is whether these injuries will amount to an assault occasioning actual bodily harm under Section 47 OAPA1861. Psychiatric harm can be grievous bodily harm or actual bodily harm; this depends on its severity. In either case, expert medical evidence is required as to the extent of the harm. R v Burstow; R v Ireland (1997)[50] establishes that neuroses should be distinguished from simple states of fear or problems coping with everyday life, but where the line is drawn is a matter of psychiatric judgement. A charge under Section 47 requires proof that Amelia has committed an assault, in the sense that she has caused Bertram to apprehend immediate physical violence. This can be established by means of a phone call, even if it is silent[51]. The type of ‘stalking’ she appears to be carrying out can amount to an assault occasioning actual bodily harm, where it causes a clinical illness (as opposed to simple anxiety and stress)[52]. However, Bertram is anxious and nervous, and suffers from lack of concentration; this is unlikely to amount to a clinical illness. The facts do not suggest either the calls, cards and letters cause him to apprehend physical violence. Merely causing him to feel uncomfortable will not suffice. If therefore the actus reus of assault is not established, the charge under Section 47 of OAPA1861 fails, as does any possible common assault charge. Even if it can be shown that Bertram did apprehend immediate physical violence, it must also be shown that Amelia intended this, or was at least aware of the risk that Bertram might suffer this harm[53]. The facts state that Amelia simply wants Bertram back; they do not suggest that her communications are in any way threatening or unpleasant, and so it seems unlikely that she will be guilty of assault for her actions. She may however be liable under the Protection From Harassment Act 1997, which provides that a person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another person, and which they knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. The sort of conduct that might qualify for this offence will include causing Bertram distress[54] which appears to be the case here. The test is an objective one and asks whether a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to or involved harassment of the other[55]. The 'reasonable person' referred to is a hypothetical reasonable person who is not endowed with the defendant's standards or characteristics[56]. On the facts it seems that Amelia would likely be guilty of harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. In conclusion, it is likely that Bertram would be liable under Section 20 of the OAPA1861, or possibly Section 47 if the Section 20 charge failed for lack of intent. The defence of consent will not be available because of the practices concerned. Amanda is unlikely to be guilty of any offences under the OAPA1861 but may be guilty under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 for causing Bertram distress.

Bibliography

Douglas, G & Molan, M (2005/6) Criminal Law (4th Edition) Oxford University Press, Oxford Halsbury’s Laws of England: Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure 2. Offences Against the Person (1) Homicide (ii) Murder 89. The Elements Halsbury’s Laws of England: Homicide (iii) Manslaughter b. voluntary manslaughter 94. Provocation as defence to murder charge Halsbury’s Laws of England: Homicide (iii) Manslaughter b. voluntary manslaughter 96. Diminished responsibility as defence to murder charge. Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law Evidence and Procedure 2. Offences Against the Person (3) Non fatal offences against the person (ii) Wounding or Causing Grievous Bodily Harm with Intent 119. Constituents of wounding etc with intent Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law Evidence and Procedure 2. Offences Against the Person (3) Non fatal offences against the person (xi) Harassment 152. Prohibitions of harassment and offence of harassment Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure 1. Principles of Criminal Liability (2) The Elements of Crime (ii) The Criminal Conduct 6. Causation Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure 1. Principles of Criminal Liability (2) The Elements of Crime (iii) The Mental Element 13. Proof of intention and foresight

Table of Cases

A-G's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 1057 Chan Kau v R [1955] AC 206, [1955] 1 All ER 266, PC DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, 44 Cr App Rep 261, HL Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1997] AC 131, [1996] 2 All ER 1033, PC Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1, 28 Cr App Rep 65, HL M'Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635 Moriarty v Brooks (1834) 6 C & P 684 R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319 R v Adams (1957) unreported, summarised at [1957] Crim LR 375 R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741 R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75 R v Brown, R v Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485, CA. R v Burstow; R v Ireland (1997) 4 All ER 225 R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396, 44 Cr App Rep 246, CCA R v Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552 R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All ER 670 R v Colohan [2001] EWCA Crim 1251, [2001] 2 FLR 757, [2001] Crim LR 845; R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576 R v Cox [1968] 1 All ER 386, 52 Cr App Rep 130, CA R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, 73 Cr App Rep 253, HL R v Donavon (1934) 2 KB 498 R v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1, 41 Cr App Rep 182, CCA R v Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454, 1 Cr App Rep 13, CCA R v G [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034, [2004] 1 Cr App Rep 237 R v Gibbins, R v Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App Rep 134, CCA R v Hancock [1986] AC 455, 82 Cr App Rep 264, HL. R v Hayward (1833) 6 C & P 157 R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133, 55 Cr App Rep 262, CA R v Hobson [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 31, CA R v Ireland, R v Burstow [1998] AC 147, [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 177, HL R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87, 42 Cr App Rep 145, CCA; R v Mellor (1996) 2 Cr App R 245 R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421 R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1991] R v Savage; R v Parmenter (1991) 3 WLR 914 R v Smith (1959) 2 All ER 193 R v Smith (Morgan) (2000) 4 All ER 289 R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023, [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 108, CA R v Woollin (1998) 4 All ER 103 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 25 Cr App Rep 72, HL

Footnotes

[1] R v Gibbins, R v Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App Rep 134, CCA [2] Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 25 Cr App Rep 72, HL; Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1, 28 Cr App Rep 65, HL [3] Halsbury’s Laws of England: Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure 2. Offences Against the Person (1) Homicide (ii) Murder 89. The Elements [4] R v Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454, 1 Cr App Rep 13, CCA; R v Adams (1957) unreported, summarised at [1957] Crim LR 375: Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure 1. Principles of Criminal Liability (2) The Elements of Crime (ii) The Criminal Conduct 6. Causation [5] Chan Kau v R [1955] AC 206, [1955] 1 All ER 266, PC [6] DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, 44 Cr App Rep 261, HL [7] R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, 73 Cr App Rep 253, HL [8] Criminal Justice Act 1967 Section 8; Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure 1. Principles of Criminal Liability (2) The Elements of Crime (iii) The Mental Element 13. Proof of intention and foresight [9] R v Hancock [1986] AC 455, 82 Cr App Rep 264, HL. [10] R v Hancock [1986] AC 455, 82 Cr App Rep 264, HL; Halsbury's Laws of England: 13. Proof of intention and foresight [11] R v Hancock [1986] AC 455, 82 Cr App Rep 264, HL [12] R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133, 55 Cr App Rep 262, CA [13] Halsbury's Laws of England: 7. Causation [14] R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 [15] R v Smith (1959) 2 All ER 193 [16] R v Mellor (1996) 2 Cr App R 245 [17] R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All ER 670 [18] Douglas & Molan, p.57 [19] R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, 73 Cr App Rep 253, HL [20] R v Hancock [1986] AC 455, 82 Cr App Rep 264, HL. [21] R v Hancock [1986] AC 455, 82 Cr App Rep 264, HL; Halsbury's Laws of England: 13. Proof of intention and foresight [22] Halsbury’s Laws of England: Homicide (iii) Manslaughter b. voluntary manslaughter 94. Provocation as defence to murder charge [23] R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319 [24] R v Hayward (1833) 6 C & P 157 [25] R v Smith (Morgan) (2000) 4 All ER 289 [26] R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023 at 1030, [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 108 at 116, CA, per Lord Taylor CJ; Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1997] AC 131 at 141, [1996] 2 All ER 1033 at 1047, PC [27] R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 403, 44 Cr App Rep 246 at 252, CCA [28] Homicide Act 1957 s 2(1) [29] R v Byrne [1960] supra [30] R v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1, 41 Cr App Rep 182, CCA [31] Homicide Act 1957 s 2(3) [32] : R v Hobson [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 31, CA [33] R v Cox [1968] 1 All ER 386, 52 Cr App Rep 130, CA [34] R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87, 42 Cr App Rep 145, CCA; Halsbury’s Laws of England: Homicide (iii) Manslaughter b. voluntary manslaughter 96. Diminished responsibility as defence to murder charge. [35] Moriarty v Brooks (1834) 6 C & P 684; M'Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635 [36] R v Ireland, R v Burstow [1998] AC 147, [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 177, HL: Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law Evidence and Procedure 2. Offences Against the Person (3) Non fatal offences against the person (ii) Wounding or Causing Grievous Bodily Harm with Intent 119. Constituents of wounding etc with intent [37] R v Brown, R v Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485, CA. [38] R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741 [39] R v Woollin (1998) 4 All ER 103 [40] Moriarty v Brooks (1834) 6 C & P 684; M'Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635 [41] R v Burstow [1997] 4 All ER 225 [42] R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1991] [43] R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1991] 4 All ER 698 [44] R v Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552 [45] R v G [2003] UKHL 50 at [41], [2004] 1 AC 1034 at [41], [2004] 1 Cr App Rep 237 at [41] per Lord Bingham of Cornhill [46] R v Donavon (1934) 2 KB 498 [47] See also A-G's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 1057 [48] R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75 [49] R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75 [50] R v Burstow; R v Ireland (1997) 4 All ER 225 [51] R v Burstow; R v Ireland, supra [52] R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576 [53] R v Savage; R v Parmenter (1991) 3 WLR 914 [54] Protection from Harassment Act s 7(2) [55] Protection from Harassment Act s 1(2) (as amended) [56] R v Colohan [2001] EWCA Crim 1251, [2001] 2 FLR 757, [2001] Crim LR 845; Halsbury's Laws of England: Criminal Law Evidence and Procedure 2. Offences Against the Person (3) Non fatal offences against the person (xi) Harassment 152. Prohibitions of harassment and offence of harassment
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